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JUDGE DONALD E. SHAVER*
I. International Criminal Court
Four years into Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, it is apparent that the Office of the
Prosecutor ("OTP") and the Court still have vastly different ideas about the use of confi-
dential information. For the second time,' the Trial Chamber has ordered the case dis-
missed for prosecutorial misconduct 2 and the Appeals Chamber has set aside the order.3
A. THE PROSECUTOR AND TH-IE TRIAL CHAMBER ON A COLLISION COURSE
The dispute arose after the Court ordered the identity of a confidential informant (an
"intermediary") disclosed to the defense. In common domestic criminal cases, it occasion-
ally occurs that the judge, usually after an in camera hearing with the informant or his/her
"handler" present, will conclude that the informant has exculpatory evidence that is neces-
sary to the defense. 4 In such cases, the prosecution must either disclose the identity of the
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1. The first time occurred on June 13, 2008. "In a high-level and rare difference of opinion with the UN"
on the eve of trial, Trial Chamber I suspended the proceedings indefinitely and ordered Lubanga released
after finding that "the widespread use by the Prosecution of confidentiality agreements under Article 54(3)(e)
[went well] beyond the limited use delineated in the statute made it impossible" for Lubanga to receive a fair
trial under such circumstances. The Appeals Chamber affirmed the Trial Chamber decision, but reinstated
the case since the issues had been resolved in the meantime. Don Shaver, International Criminal Court Begins
First Trial: Case was Nearly Dirmissed Earlier for Prosecutorial Aluse, 3 INr'L CRIUMINAL L. CoMM. NEWSL., 1,
4 n.45 (2009), available at http://meetings.abanet.org/webupload/commupload/IC935000/newsletterpubs/In-
ternational.Criminal.Law.NewsletterJan.2009.pdf.
2. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Trial Chamber Redacted Decision
on Intermediaries, 150 (May 31, 2010).
3. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment on the Appeal of the
Prosecutor Against the Decision of Trial Chamber I of 8 July 2010 entitled 'Decision on the Prosecution's
Urgent Request for Variation of the Time-Limit to Disclose the Identity of Intermediary 143 or Alternatively
to Stay Proceedings Pending Further Consultations with the VWU,' (Oct. 8, 2010) [hereinafter Judgment].
4. See People v. Hobbs, 873 P.2d 1246 (Cal. 1994).
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informant or suffer a dismissal of the case.5 The question indirectly raised by this case was
the extent to which this procedure applies on the international level.
The matter came about after the defense recalled certain alleged child soldier witnesses
and their parents who recanted their earlier testimonies, stating that they had been pres-
sured by investigators for the OTP.6 To rebut these statements, the Prosecution called
OTP investigators and a previously confidential "intermediary" (number 321) who de-
scribed how "intermediaries," who were usually local residents or involved with NGOs,
would locate former child soldiers and bring them to the OTP investigators, who would
then interview them and determine if they would be good witnesses. However, this testi-
mony led to the disclosure of unspecified new information involving another intermediary
(number 143), who was still confidential and still working in the field.7 In a closed session,
the defense set forth to the Court why they could not adequately cross examine number
321 until they knew who number 143 was, and the Court apparently accepted this pro-
position.8 On May 12, the Court ordered disclosure of number 143's identity only (no
appearance required) to the defense once the necessary protective measures were imple-
mented by the Victim Witness Unit of the Court ("VWU").9 The Prosecution balked,
fearing that number 143's safety would still be jeopardized, and it requested a stay in the
proceedings to appeal the Court's order.' 0 On June 2, the Court denied this request."
On July 5, the VWU notified the Court that appropriate protective measures had been
worked out with number 143, and the trial and cross exam of number 321 was set to
resume the next day.12 However, prior to resuming the next day, the Prosecution re-
ported that number 143 was having second thoughts about the adequacy of the protective
measures and was requesting an additional delay until the end of the week so that number
143 could further review the measures in writing.13 The Defense objected to any further
delays, and the Trial Chamber agreed with the Defense. The Court feared that the delay
could "inevitably be substantial, and that delay has to be seen in the context of the very
considerable delays that have already been experienced in relation to this trial."' 4 The
Court denied the request and ordered the Prosecution to immediately disclose the identity
of number 143.1s To alleviate the fears of the Prosecution, the Court imposed a protective
order preventing dissemination beyond counsel and their agents.16 The Prosecution re-
5. Id. at 972.
6. Wairagala Wakabi, Lubanga TrialAt ICC Resumes Nest Week, Ti E LUBANGA TIUAL AT THE INTERNA-
TIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, Oct. 19, 2010, http://www.lubangatrial.org/2010/10/19/lubanga-trial-at-icc-re-
sumes-next-week/.
7. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, 9 7.
8. Id.
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quested that the order be stayed while they prepared a request to appeal this order.' 7 The
Court reluctantly put the matter over one more day.
B. "PROFOUND AND ENDURING CONCERN"
At this point, the trial, which would be the first for the ICC, was close to completion.
Both the prosecution and the defense had completed their cases, and the prosecution was
presenting its rebuttal evidence. The start of the trial had been delayed six months from
July 2008 to January 2009. Originally estimated to be completed in twelve months, it was
now well into its eighteenth month. There had been frequent logistical problems. The
Court and parties were anxious to conclude it without further delays. This was not a good
time for a major confrontation between the Court and the OTP. Clearly, everyone's
patience was wearing thin.
The next morning, with the parties reassembled, the Court made a last-ditch effort to
see if the defense could proceed with cross-examination of 321 and reserve those issues
relating to number 143 to a later time.18 The defense replied that these requests were not
feasible. The Court then ordered immediate disclosure of the identity one more time,
specifically finding that the protective measures contemplated by VWU would be ade-
quate.19 The Prosecution requested adjournment to the afternoon to respond.
Upon reconvening in the afternoon, the Prosecution requested the Court to reconsider
its order.20 The Court adjourned and did so, but on returning later, once again ordered
immediate disclosure. 21 The Prosecution once again requested a brief delay to allow it to
confer with the VWU regarding the protective measures.22 The Prosecution argued that
this delay was necessary because it was "bound by autonomous statutory duties of protec-
tion that [it] had to honour at all times" and that it had to be satisfied that disclosure
would not violate this ethical obligation.23 In explaining its refusal to comply with the
Court's order at this time, the Prosecutor stated:
The Prosecution is sensitive to its obligation to comply with the Chamber's instruc-
tions. However, it also has an independent statutory obligation to protect persons
put at risk on account of the Prosecution's actions. It should not comply, or be asked
to comply, with an Order that may require it to violate its separate statutory obliga-
tion by subjecting the person to a foreseeable risk. The Prosecutor accordingly has
made a determination that the Prosecution would rather face adverse consequences in
its litigation than expose a person to risk on account of prior interaction with this
Office. This is not a challenge to the authority of the Chamber, it is instead a reflec-
tion of the Prosecution's own legal duty under the Statute.24
The Court convened the next day, and, in view of this reply, ordered the case "stayed as
an abuse of process of the Court" (tantamount to a dismissal) due to the deliberate refusal
17. Id.
18. Id. 1 8.
19. Id. T 9.
20. Id. T 10.
2 1. Id.
22. Id. 1 11.
23. Id.
24. Id. 1 12.
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to follow an order of the Court. 25 Of more concern to the Court (a "profound and endur-
ing concern"), however, was the perceived implication by the Prosecution that they could
pick and choose which orders of the Court to follow, based on their interpretation of the
Statute.26 The Court made the point in particular that once the trial starts, the protection
of witnesses becomes the Court's responsibility, not the Prosecution's, and they have the
last word on the adequacy of protection measures, not the Prosecution.27
C. THE APPEALS CHAMBER DECISION
Unfortunately, this ruling did not prevent the further delays, which the Trial Chamber
feared. The trial was suspended while the appeal was pending from July through October,
at which time the Appeals Chamber reversed the dismissal order, reinstating the trial.
The Appeals Chamber, which was, no doubt, reluctant to see the ICC's first trial end in a
dismissal for prosecutorial abuse of process, found that the Trial Chamber had not done
enough to resolve the issue prior to ordering the indefinite stay of proceedings. By the
time the appeal was decided, the Prosecution had completed its review of the protective
measures and 143 had agreed to disclosure. By November, 321 was back on the stand
testifying. The trial was expected to conclude by the end of the year.
In its ruling, the Appeals Chamber confirmed that "when there is a conflict between the
Prosecutor's perception of his duties and the orders of the Trial Chamber, the Trial
Chamber's orders must prevail." 28 However, the Appeals Chamber explained that the
dismissal sanction is a "drastic remedy" which has the potential to frustrate the overall
objectives of the justice system.29 It is an "exceptional" remedy with a "high threshold"
and should be used only once it is no longer possible to salvage a fair trial from the pro-
ceedings.30 In this case, the Appeals Chamber found that this threshold had not yet been
reached because the Trial Chamber had not attempted to use monetary sanctions to com-
pel disclosure, and had not made a finding that there was nothing further that could be
done to salvage the trial.3' The Appeals Chamber explained that it was not necessarily
holding that monetary sanctions were always a necessary prerequisite to dismissal but sim-
ply that there was nothing in the record to show that they had been considered. 32
D. THE UNANSWERED QUESTION: DOES THE PROSECUTOR HAVE AN INDEPENDENT
ETHICAL OBLIGATION TO PROTECT WITNESSES TO WHOM IT HAS
PROMISED CONFIDENTIALITY?
In its ruling, however, the Appeals Chamber did not resolve the dispute between the
Prosecution and the Court and left some very important questions unanswered. Most
notably, it did not resolve whether or not the Prosecution does have an independent ethi-
25. Id. 13.
26. Id. 9 15.
27. Id.




32. Id. 1 60, n.135.
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cal obligation toward those witnesses which the Prosecution has recruited to cooperate at
personal risk to their life and safety, nor did it provide guidance to the Court and parties
regarding how to resolve the contest of wills that develops when an attorney believes that
an order of the Court places him or her in an ethical dilemma. Simply stating that "the
Court's decision is final" gives short shrift to this important question.
Attorneys are generally perceived to have a number of universal ethical obligations,
similar to those contained in the ICC Rules of Professional Conduct.33 These rules in-
clude such ethical obligations as not disclosing client confidences, 34 not undertaking rep-
resentation if there is a conflict of interest with a former or current client, 35 and
representing the client zealously and with a minimum required level of competence.36
Prosecuting attorneys generally also have a number of ethical obligations as relating to
their positions of trust.37 One such obligation deals specifically with protecting the iden-
tity of confidential informants. Customary criminal law provides the prosecution with a
"Privilege of Non-disclosure" due to this ethical obligation.38 Under this privilege, if dis-
closure is ordered over the objection of the prosecution, the prosecution has the election
to forfeit the evidence related to the informant or dismiss the case, if the former is not
feasible. 39 This election is not considered an abuse of process or bad faith. Thus, the
Prosecution's suggestion that a similar process should apply here is not without precedent.
The Rome Statute does not expressly contain such a privilege but does impose a similar
duty to protect on the Prosecution, which can equally be viewed as an ethical obligation.
Article 68(1) imposes a duty on both the Court and OTP to "protect the safety, physical
and psychological well-being and privacy of victims and witnesses."40 The Appeals Cham-
ber confirmed that the Trial Chamber does have the last word when protection issues arise
at trial, but did not comment on the dual nature of this obligation.41 However, the Trial
Chamber took the position that the entire responsibility for protecting witnesses trans-
ferred to them once the trial started.42 A fair reading of the Statute suggests that this is
not the case. Article 68(1) initially assigns the duty of protecting witnesses to the Court,
but then adds that "[t~he Prosecutor shall take such measures particularly during the inves-
tigation and prosecution of such crimes [emphasis added]." 43 It would not seem logical to
read "particularly" to mean "only." Moreover, the "prosecution" of a crime is commonly
interpreted to include the trial of the offense, not just the investigation. Thus, it seems
clear that this joint duty to protect is an on-going duty of both the Court and the Prosecu-
33. Code of Professional Conduct for Counsel, Resolution, ICC-ASP/4/Res.1 (Dec. 2, 2005).
34. Id. art. 8.
35. Id. arts. 12, 16.
36. Id. art. 7.
37. The OTP has a general duty to "uphold the highest standards of ... integrity." Regulations of the
Office of the Prosecutor, ICC-BD/05-01-09, Regulation 17.
38. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
39. McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 111 (John W. Strong ed., 1999); see CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 1040-47
(West 2011).
40. Prosecution's Document in Support of Appeal Against Trial Chamber I's Decision of 8 July 2010 to
Stay the Proceedings for Abuse of Process, supra note 13, 1 62.
41. Judgment, 1 48.
42. Under the Trial Chamber's interpretation, the prosecution is no longer vested with any duty of protec-
tion once a Chamber is "seized of the matter and has ruled." Trial Chamber Redacted Decision on In-
termediaries, supra note 2, [ 29.
43. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Article 68(1).
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tion.44 In view of the fact that the Court regulations require that any time the conditions
of a protective measure are being altered, "the Chamber shall seek to obtain, whenever
possible, the consent of the person" protected,45 and it appeared to the Prosecution that
the Court was preparing to order disclosure without the party's consent even though it
might still be possible to get that consent, it is easy to see why they felt that they were in
an ethical dilemma.
In their decision, the Appeals Chamber clearly affirmed that the Trial Chamber orders
must be followed46 and that the Prosecution's "willful non-compliance constituted a clear
refusal to implement the orders of the Chamber," finding that the Prosecutor's refusal to
be "disingenuous."4 7 However, this characterization belittles the nature of the Prosecu-
tion's joint ethical obligation arising out of Article 68(1). The issue here was not what
decision the Court made. The Court has to make the final decision, and the Prosecution
did not contend otherwise. The issue here was how the decision was made. A trial court
must make a myriad of decisions during a trial, and many decisions may be made summa-
rily without extended consultation with the attorneys. However, it is generally recognized
that when an objection is lodged by a party that a court order conflicts with an attorney's
ethical obligation, the Court should proceed carefully, giving increased deference to the
party's concern, and a chance for a full hearing on the issue. Every effort should be made
to resolve the issue short of imposing sanctions.48 Taking such extra time at the trial level,
even when it disrupts an already impacted trial schedule, usually pays off dividends when
the case is reviewed by the Appeals Court. The Prosecution's ethical obligation to protect
a confidential witness in this case should have been viewed as solemnly as any of the
ethical obligations of defense attorneys, and the dilemma which the Court's order created
for the OTP deserved more extensive consideration by the Court than it received.
A decision whether or not to proceed with a particular charge or issue based on risk to
an informant is one that the Prosecution is uniquely qualified to make. Courts generally
do not consider it an insult or an affront to their authority when the Prosecution must
make such a decision. Rather, courts will generally welcome such a decision in order to
avoid putting themselves in the delicate position of feeling morally responsible if an in-
formant whom they have ordered disclosed is subsequently the unfortunate victim of an
untoward occurrence.
44. Prosecution's Document in Support of Appeal Against Trial Chamber I's Decision of 8 July 2010 to
Stay the Proceedings for Abuse of Process, supra note 13, 11 62-64.
45. Regulations of the Court, ICC-BD/01-01-04, Regulation 42(4).
46. Judgment, 1 48.
47. Id. 1 46.
48. The prosecution suggested a number of alternate sanctions that could have been considered before the
ultimate sanction of dismissal would apply, including exclusion of witnesses or evidence on particular issues
(so-called "issues sanctions") or a "partial dismissal" of one or more, but not all, separate charges. Each of
these suggestions are consistent with established jurisprudence, but did not appear to have been considered by
the Trial Chamber. Prosecution's Document in Support of Appeal Against Trial Chamber I's Decision of 8
July 2010 to Stay the Proceedings for Abuse of Process, supra note 13, 11 75, 82.
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